

# 大阪大学

## 英語

### 問題

#### 2018年度入試

- 【学部】 文学部、人間科学部、外国語学部、法学部、経済学部、理学部、医学部、歯学部、薬学部、工学部、基礎工学部
- 【入試名】 前期日程
- 【試験日】 2月25日



「過去問ライブラリーは、（株）旺文社が刊行する「全国大学入試問題正解」を中心とした過去問、研究・解答（解答・解説）を掲載しています。本サービスに関する知的財産権その他一切の権利は、（株）旺文社または各情報提供者に帰属します。本サービスに掲載の全部または一部の無断複製、配布、転載、譲渡等を禁止します。各設問に対する「研究・解答」は原則として旺文社が独自に作成したものを掲載しています。掲載問題のうち★印を付したものは、著作権法第67条の2第1項の規定により文化庁長官に裁定申請を行った上で利用しています。

裁定申請日 【2017年】 8/1 【2018年】 4/24、9/20 【2019年】 6/20

**1** 次の英文(A)と(B)を読み、それぞれの下線部の意味を日本語で表しなさい。

- (A) Growing older is an activity we are familiar with from an early age. In our younger years upcoming birthdays are anticipated with a glee that somewhat diminishes as the years progress. Our younger selves feel that time moves slowly, whereas, with advancing years, time seems to fly at an ever-quickening pace. And late in life, or when a person is faced with a terminal illness no matter what their age, the sense of a finite amount of time remaining becomes acute, and there may be a renewed focus on making the most of one's allotted time in life.
- (B) Culture is the location of values, and the study of cultures shows how values vary from one society to another, or from one historical moment to the next.
- But culture does not exist in the abstract. On the contrary, it is inscribed in the paintings, operas, fashions, and shopping lists which are the currency of both aesthetic and everyday exchange. Societies invest these artefacts with meanings, until in many cases the meanings are so "obvious" that they pass for nature. Cultural criticism denaturalizes and defamiliarizes these meanings, isolating them for inspection and analysis.

## 2 (外国語学部志願者のみ)

次の英文を読んで、以下の設問に答えなさい。

Adults live in many worlds: a perceptual world, a world of the past, a world of the future, and a mediated world, available through TV, books, newspapers, and hearsay. ① Babies by contrast live in an immediate perceptual world, pretty much exclusively, little guided by memories or anticipations. Young babies can be enslaved by perceptual displays, stuck on them and stuck to them. Perception in young babies is not yet integrated into an overall context of behavior, and this integration is an essential part of perceptual development.

The process of habituation obviously serves to free the baby from attention to the increasingly familiar details of his environment. However, it is not for many months after the beginnings of habituation that he shows an ability to ignore new things that crop up while he is trying to do something else. An interesting behavioral trick of this sort is gaze aversion: a literal refusal to look at something, either because it is puzzling or because it is distracting. The latter motive is the more interesting for our purposes. Unfortunately, it is relatively unstudied. But one context where this kind of behavior has been noticed is reaching. Recall that babies of four to five months can be distracted from a reach by the sight of their hand in the visual field. Sometimes a baby at this point in development will look away from the object he is reaching for, presumably so that his hand can get unseen to the object. If this interpretation of the looking away is correct, it implies a rather developed integration of perception with behavior, a realization that an act may be disrupted by its perceptual consequences and an awareness of how to avoid these disruptions.

All of this seems very sophisticated. Unfortunately there are many other real-life situations where the baby does not seem able to call upon such resources. Rudolph Schaffer has remarked that ② babies are unable to restrain themselves from reaching out to grab any new object that is put before them. Not until the last quarter of the first year will babies stop to take a good look at what is presented to them before reaching out to grab it. An amusing example of how nonfunctional this is was provided by Jerome Bruner.

Bruner gave a baby a toy. The baby took it. He then offered the baby another toy. The baby took it with his other hand. He offered the baby still another toy. If the baby was especially dextrous, he could grab this third one, while keeping a grip on the first two. At this point the baby is sitting like an overtrimmed Christmas tree, not really able to play with any of the three toys. Now comes the denouement. The baby is offered a fourth toy. Crash! The first three drop, any old where, as the baby compulsively reaches out to take the new thing on offer.

Older babies develop a more rational way of coping with situations like this, but it takes a long time.

The same sort of process may be involved in some aspects of ③ the development of object permanence. The baby goes through several stages before he comes to believe that objects continue to exist even when they are no longer in sight. A natural situation is one in which, say, a ball rolls behind a chair. If the child retrieves the ball after its disappearance behind the chair, he must have some understanding of the ball's continuing existence which is not dependent upon his perception of it. A baby's growing ability to find an object that has been hidden can be tested by placing the object inside one of a set of other objects, with various odd permutations carried out to make the finding more difficult. At some point in this developmental sequence a baby will stop his search routine if he finds anything at all under any of the cups or cloths that have been used as hiding places. It doesn't matter how unlike the original target of the search the new object is. This could result from poor memory, or from the kind of distractibility we have been talking about. This distractibility is over by the time the baby is a year old. At this point and by some mysterious process, our infant begins to use his perceptual system, rather than being used by it. Internal memories and expectations control the baby's behavior, and he uses his perceptual system to realize these expectations.

Along with ④ this kind of change goes a fascinating change in the status of perception within the hierarchy of systems that control the baby's behavior. We are all familiar with situations in which we refuse to believe our eyes, not accepting the evidence of our senses. We are not normally called upon to doubt our senses in any dramatic context. Most often it is an everyday situation where we are subjected to some illusion. The most dramatic instances come when we are watching a stage magician: we know that we are being deceived yet often cannot say why. There is a clear point in development when, it seems, the baby assumes a similar superior status in regard to the data provided by his senses. There is a developmental shift that results in babies, too, refusing to believe their eyes, when the visual evidence contradicts some internal knowledge about the world.

In ⑤ one of my own investigations I used a device that could make solid objects appear to fade away softly and silently, like puffs of smoke in the wind or banks of fog dissolving in a hot sun. This was achieved by a system of half-silvered mirrors that could be lit to show either an object or a blank space; the perceived change after a gradual change in the lighting was of an object slowly dissolving into nothing. My own older children referred to this device as a Boojum box. Nonetheless they were not the

least afraid of the box and were quite happy to climb in and out of it. They “knew” that solid real objects do not dissolve like puffs of smoke. Babies acquire this knowledge toward the end of the first year of life. Faced with my box, young babies seemed to accept that the objects in question were gone. After the disappearance of the object they showed no further interest in the display. By the age of one year, this acceptance of visual input was over. The babies crawled up to the box, banged it, peered around it and then around the rest of the room until they found the object that had disappeared, at which point they would glare at me, expressing wordlessly the feelings of triumph they may well have been experiencing.

⑥ Distrust of the senses and reliance on other sources of knowledge grows during development. Indeed there is some evidence that the process goes so far that one can be led into illusions. Adults are quite susceptible to illusions produced by presenting odd-sized versions of familiar objects. An oversized chair will be as normal-sized and at a closer distance than it really is. A miniature Rolls-Royce is seen as normal-sized but at a greater distance than it really is. But children of up to five or six years of age will give a reasonable estimate of the true size and distance of the aberrant objects presented. Beyond this age they become as susceptible to the illusion as adults are.

Reliance on knowledge rather than on the immediate information from the senses is good policy in many more situations than it is not. Older children can use knowledge to overcome the built-in disabilities of the perceptual system in ways that younger children cannot. A simple demonstration of this is the horizontal-vertical illusion. A vertical line looks longer than a horizontal line that is actually of the same length. If you start with two horizontal lines both of the same length, and rotate one to the vertical position, you have put knowledge of the length before rotation in conflict with the immediate perception that the vertical line is longer. Children of up to six resolve the conflict in favor of perception and say that the vertical line is longer. Older children by contrast say that, although the vertical line *looks* longer, both are *really* the same.

This sophisticated separation of appearance and reality is a continuation of the initial separations made in infancy, and a separation that will continue throughout life. Much adult thought is about unseen and unseeable entities: for example, luck, God, responsibility. Any mental system that kept perception in the preeminent position that it occupies in the postnatal period would be quite incapable of coping with these fictive entities. ⑦ It has been argued that we would be happier and healthier if we stayed closer to the world of our senses. That might be so, but there is no way we shall ever know. The development away from perceptual preeminence seems universal, occurring in all cultures at all times.

設問(1) 下線部①の意味を日本語で表しなさい。

設問(2) 下線部②の意味を日本語で表しなさい。

設問(3) 下線部③はどのようなことか、本文中の具体例を用いて日本語で説明しなさい。

設問(4) 下線部④はどのようなことか、日本語で説明しなさい。

設問(5) 下線部⑤は、およそ1歳を境に、どのような違いが生じることを示そうとした実験ですか。日本語で説明しなさい。

設問(6) 下線部⑥の内容を本文中の具体例を用いて日本語で説明しなさい。

設問(7) 下線部⑦では、なぜこのように述べられているのか。本文に即して日本語で説明しなさい。



### 3 (外国語学部以外の志願者のみ)

次の英文を読んで、以下の設問に答えなさい。

For 2,000 years, there was an intuitive, elegant, compelling picture of how the world worked. It was called “the ladder of nature.” God was at the top, followed by angels, who were followed by humans. Then came the animals, starting with noble wild beasts and descending to domestic animals and insects. Human animals followed the scheme, too. Women ranked lower than men, and children were beneath them. The ladder of nature was a scientific picture, but it was also a moral and political one. It was only natural that creatures higher up would have <sup>(i)</sup> dominion over those lower down.

Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection delivered a serious blow to this conception. Natural selection is a blind historical process, stripped of moral hierarchy. A cockroach is just as well adapted to its environment as I am to mine. In fact, <sup>(a)</sup> the bug may be better adapted — cockroaches have been around a lot longer than humans have, and may well survive after we are gone. But the very word evolution can imply a progression, and in the 19th century, it was still common to translate evolutionary ideas ( A ) ladder-of-nature terms.

Modern biological science has in principle rejected the ladder of nature. But <sup>(b)</sup> the intuitive picture is still powerful. In particular, the idea that children and nonhuman animals are lesser beings has been surprisingly persistent. Even scientists often act as if children and animals are defective adult humans, defined by the abilities we have and they don’t. Neuroscientists, for example, sometimes compare brain-damaged adults to children and animals.

We always should have been <sup>(ii)</sup> suspicious of this picture, but now we have no excuse for continuing with it. In the past 30 years, research has explored the distinctive ways in which children as well as animals think, and the discoveries challenge the ladder of nature. Frans de Waal has been at the forefront of the animal research, and its most important public voice. In his book, *Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are?*, he makes a passionate and convincing <sup>(iii)</sup> case for the sophistication of nonhuman minds.

De Waal outlines both the exciting new results and the troubled history of the field. The study of animal minds was long divided between what are sometimes called “scoffers” and “boosters.” Scoffers refused to acknowledge that animals could think ( B ) all: Behaviorism — the idea that scientists shouldn’t talk about minds, only about stimuli and responses — stuck around in animal research long after it had been discredited in the rest of psychology. Boosters often relied on anecdotes instead of experiments.

Psychologists often assume that there is a special cognitive ability that makes humans different from other animals. The list of candidates is long: tool use, cultural transmission, the ability to imagine the future or to understand other minds, and so on. But every one of these abilities shows ( C ) in at least some other species in at least some form. De Waal points out various examples, and there are many more. Some crows make elaborate tools, shaping branches into pointed \*termite-extraction devices. A few Japanese monkeys learned to wash sweet potatoes and even to dip them in the sea to make them more salty, and passed that technique on to subsequent generations.

From an evolutionary perspective, it makes sense that <sup>(c)</sup> these human abilities also appear in other species. After all, the whole point of natural selection is that small variations among existing organisms can eventually give rise ( D ) new species. Our hands and hips and those of our \*\*primate relatives gradually diverged from the hands and hips of common ancestors. It’s not that we miraculously grew hands and hips and other animals didn’t. So why would we alone possess some distinctive cognitive skill that no other species has in any form?

As de Waal recognizes, a better way to think about other creatures would be to ask ourselves how different species have developed different kinds of minds to solve different adaptive problems. Surely the important question is not whether an octopus or a crow can do the same things a human can, but how those animals solve the cognitive problems they face, like how to imitate the sea floor or make a tool with their beak. <sup>(d)</sup> Children and chimps and crows and octopuses are ultimately so interesting not because they are smart like us, but because they are smart in ways we haven’t even considered.

\*termite: シロアリ      \*\*primate: 霊長類

設問(1) 本文中の空所 ( A )～( D ) を埋めるのに最も適当な語を以下から選びなさい。ただし同じ語が2度入ることはありません。

at      for      into      on      to      up

設問(2) 本文中の下線部(i)～(iii)の語を言い換えるとしたら、どれが最も適当か、(イ)～(ニ)から1つ選び、記号で答えなさい。

(i) dominion

(イ) control

(ロ) expertise

(ハ) territory

(ニ) zone

(ii) suspicious

(イ) afraid

(ロ) alert

(ハ) disposed

(ニ) wary

(iii) case

- (イ) argument (ロ) instance (ハ) situation (ニ) solution

設問(3) 下線部(a)の主張について、筆者はどのような具体的論拠を示していますか。50字以内の日本語で答えなさい。ただし字数には句読点を含みます。

設問(4) 下線部(b)で述べられていることの結果として、科学者はどのように考える傾向にありますか。日本語で簡潔に答えなさい。

設問(5) 下線部(c)で述べられていることを、本文であげられている2種類の動物の例に即して、日本語で説明しなさい。

設問(6) 下線部(d)のように筆者が考える理由を本文から探し、日本語で答えなさい。

設問(7) 本文の内容に合致しているものを、(イ)～(ホ)から2つ選び、記号で答えなさい。

- (イ) 進化論は、新しい考え方であったばかりではなく、伝統的な思想の枠組みに適合する側面をも持っていた。  
 (ロ) De Waal は、進化論が否定しようとした考え方を、現代生物学の中でもう一度生かすという難題に挑戦している。  
 (ハ) 動物は思考するという立場をとった研究者たちは、動物の精神を刺激と反応の観点から考えるべきだと主張した。  
 (ニ) 進化論によって、なぜわれわれ人間だけが、他の動物にはもともと見られない認知機能を持つようになったのかが解明できる。  
 (ホ) 旧来の思想を根本的に揺るがしたのは、生物は環境適応の過程で、それぞれの種に特有な精神を発達させたという考え方である。

**4** 人生、誰しも失敗がつきものですが、あなたはこれまでどのような失敗を経験し、そこからいかなることを学びましたか。最も印象的な事例を具体的に1つあげ、70語程度の英語で説明しなさい。

**5** (外国語学部以外の志願者のみ)

次の日本語(A)と(B)のそれぞれの下線部の意味を英語で表しなさい。ただし、(B)では、**文学部の志願者は(イ)を、文学部以外の学部の志願者は(ロ)を選んで解答しなさい。**

(A) (すべての学部の志願者)

こんな経験はないだろうか。独りでいると寂しいのに、あまり長い時間、皆で一緒にいると、どこか鬱陶(うつとう)しくなる。人類の場合、社会をつくるのが生物学的に決まっているわけではないので、集団をつくってともに生きることは自然なことではない。そのために人類はどのような工夫をしているのだろうか。

(B)

(イ) (文学部の志願者)

文化とは、人が自ら住んでいる地域内での生存の手段として形成したもので、個々人が集団から継承した社会的遺産を意味する。ある特定の文化内で、我々はコミュニケーションという手段を通して他者との関係を築き、自分に与えられた仕事を遂行し、目標を達成している。そして1つの世代から次の世代への文化の発展、維持そして伝達や、複数の世代にわたる文化的目標と文化的価値をより堅固なものにするという意味においても、コミュニケーションは重要な役割を果たしている。このように、我々が文化と文化に即した行動に対する影響を理解する上で、コミュニケーションは特別な役割を果たしているのである。

(ロ) (文学部以外の学部の志願者)

科学者が謙虚に自然現象の謎を解き明かして、「法則」に対する認識を深めるとき、法則の先にある奥深い世界がとらえられる。そして、それまで無関係だと思っていた複数の法則が自然現象の異なる表現であって、実は相互に関連し合っていることが分かれば、一段深いレベルでの理解に達したことになる。そのとき、自然は全く新たな形で人々の前に現れるだろう。

**6** (外国語学部志願者のみ)

次の日本語の下線部(1)～(3)の意味を英語で表しなさい。

(1) 僕は本を楽しむみたいという気持ちで、わくわくしながら開きます。少なくとも「この本、全然おもしろくなかった」と僕が誇らしげに言うことはありません。自分がおもしろさをわからなかっただけじゃないかと思うんです。自分が楽しみ方を間違えたのではないかと。

自転車に一度では乗れなかった僕が、何回も練習して自在に乘れるようになった。あの時の快感が忘れられません。だから、自分の才能を棚にあげて適当な発言はできない。どうせ読むなら、楽しむという指標において、本+自分の読み方の総合点では誰にも負けたくないです。誰よりもおもしろく読みたい。

(2) どれだけ腹が減っていても不味い飯は存在します。それでも、どんな店に行っても「不味い、不味い」と口癖のように言っている人に腹立ちませんか。そんなに、自分が好きな店を見つけられないものかなと思います。好きな店の気配を嗅ぎわける嗅覚が育たないものかなと思うんです。お前は何回同じ過ちを繰り返せば気が済むのかと。

(3) 読書も同じで、徹底的に否定して批判して溜飲を下げるというスタイルをとっている人や、名作と呼ばれるものをこき下ろすことによって個性を出したい人もいて、それが気持ち良いならそれでいいんですけど。評論家じゃなくて、趣味の読書なら楽しんだ方が得だし自分のためにも良いと思うんです。

(又吉直樹『夜を乗り越える』)

**7** (外国語学部志願者のみ リスニング問題)省略