京都府立医科大学

平成31年度医学科入学試験問題


英語

〔注意事項〕

- 1 監督者の指示があるまで、この冊子を開いてはいけない。
- 2 解答用紙に受験番号と氏名を必ず記入すること。
- 3 この問題冊子の本文は、17ページからなっている。落丁、乱丁及び印刷不鮮明な箇所等があれば、手をあげて監督者に知らせなさい。
- 4 この問題冊子の白紙と余白は、適宜下書きに使用してもよい。
- 5 解答は、すべて別紙「解答用紙」の指定された場所に記入すること。
- 6 この問題冊子は持ち帰ること。

問題訂正·補足説明

試験科目火 20



受験者に対して、

試験開始前に問題訂正があることを口頭で伝えた上、試験開始直後に訂正文を受理後直ちに問題訂正があることを口頭で伝えた上

上枠の内容を 黒板に書いて 下さい。 口頭で受験者に指示して

Read the following passage and answer the questions which follow.

What all ideologies have in common is that they like to present their own utopia as an End to History — whether in the form of universal communism, global democracy or Nazi rule for 1000 years. They share what Ignazio Silone once described as 'the widespread virtue that identifies History with the winning side'. They read the present back into the past, and assume — for instance—that democracy must be rooted deeply in Europe's soil simply because the Cold War turned out the way it did. Today a different kind of history is needed — less useful as a political instrument but bringing us closer to past realities — which sees the present as just one possible outcome of our predecessors' struggles and uncertainties. After all, democracy reigned supreme in Europe as the First World War ended, but was virtually dying two decades later. And if 1989 marked democracy's victory over communism, it was a victory which could not have come about without communism's earlier comprehensive and shattering defeat of Nazism in the war. It was thus not predetermined that democracy should win out over fascism and communism, just as it remains still to be seen what kind of democracy Europe is able and willing to build. In short, what I describe here is a story of unexpected twists and turns, not inevitable victories and forward marches.

Ideologies matter, not so much as guides to history, but as vehicles for belief and political action. If the dogmas of the past no longer hold us in their grip, this does not mean they were merely grand deceptions from the start. The end of communism has been described as 'the passing of an illusion', but simply claiming that it is dead is not a historical analysis. After 1945, fascism was similarly explained away as a political pathology by which insane dictators (3) misled their nations to their doom. Yet the wounds of the continent cannot be dismissed as the work of a few madmen, and its traumas will not be found to lie in the mental condition of Hitler or Stalin. Like it or not, both fascism and

communism involved real efforts to tackle the problems of mass politics, of industrialization and social order; liberal democracy did not always have all the answers. 'We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and simply call it our heritage,' writes Hannah Arendt, 'to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury.'

Nazism, in particular, fits into the mainstream not only of German but also of European history far more comfortably than most people like to admit. If Soviet communism involved a truly radical break with the past — an attempt, in Europe's most underdeveloped and war-torn country, to create a new property-less society, to hold together a disintegrating empire simultaneously to compress an industrial revolution into a few years - Nazism, by contrast, was less ambitious and far more secure at home, and ultimately Its revolutionary rhetoric masked greater far more aggressive abroad. continuities of ideas and institutions with the past. Its construction of a racialnationalist welfare system simply pushed to extremes tendencies already Moreover, it held power against a small visible in European thought. opposition in Europe's most technologically advanced economy. Yet this solidly established regime was committed in a way the Soviet Union never was to overthrowing the Treaty of Versailles by force. This is why it was Nazi Germany which posed the most serious challenge to liberal democracy in the twentieth century, and why an analysis of the changing content of European democratic thought and practice means acknowledging the very real possibility that emerged in the late 1930s of a continent organized along Nazi lines.

It would of course be possible to take a different view of the twentieth century, focusing less upon fascism than upon communism. Marxist historians downplay fascism's importance in its concentration upon what it regards as the fundamental struggle between communism and capitalism. If I have chosen not to do that in this essay, it is partly because communism's impact upon democracy—important though it was—was in general more indirect and less

threatening than the challenge posed by Hitler. The other reason this essay does not downplay fascism's importance is because the twentieth century showed us that politics cannot be reduced to economics. Any differences in values and ideologies must be taken seriously and not simply be regarded as complements of social class interest. Fascism, in other words, was more than just another form of capitalism.

Precisely because the Nazi utopia of a dynamic, racially purified German empire required a war for its fulfilment, and because that utopia was also a terrifying revelation of the destructive potential in European civilization—turning imperialism against Europe and treating Europeans as Africans—the experience of fascism's New Order (and its short-lived appeal) was forgotten as quickly as possible after 1945. The city council of Bologna melted down its bronze statue of Mussolini on horseback and re-made it as a noble pair of fighters for the resistance; France celebrated the memory of a united opposition to the Vichy government, while Austria shamelessly exploited its status as Hitler's first victim and erected memorials to its anti-Nazi 'fighters for Austrian freedom'. These were the foundation myths of a Europe liberated from history; they erased awkward memories and asserted the inevitability of freedom's triumph.

Keeping intact a sense of European civilizational superiority also involved an endless redrawing of mental boundaries. The so-called 'European Community' implicitly ignored half the continent: post-war Europe became equated with the West. Upset East Europeans convinced themselves that they formed 'central Europe' to distance themselves from the barbarians. The habit persists today: a leading British historian recently described the war in Bosnia as 'a primitive, tribal conflict only anthropologists can understand', preferring to see Yugoslavia as part of the barbaric Third World than to accept that contemporary Europe itself might be contaminated. Not even the murderous record of the twentieth century has yet, it seems, diminished Europeans'

capacity for self-delusion.

My own geographical conception of Europe and its limits is basically a pragmatic one. This is an essay about events and struggles within Europe rather than about Europe's place in the world. But of course it is not possible to consider Hitler's continental ambitions without seeing them in the context of European imperialism overseas, nor to describe the Cold War without reference to the United States. The Soviet Union—as the great Eurasian power—stands both inside and outside European history at different times. Hence this is a Europe whose boundaries—as in reality—are not strictly established but adaptable. Eastern Europe is no less a part of the story than the West, the Balkans no less than Scandinavia.

As ever, issues of geography disguise arguments about politics, religion and culture, and those who are keen to establish Europe's unity will find my doubts deeply unsatisfying. Yet this merely corresponds to the uncertainty which now surrounds the concept of Europe itself. Fascism, after all, was the most Eurocentric of the three major ideologies, far more so than either communism or liberal democracy: a belief which was both anti-American and anti-communist at least had the virtue of clarity. What Europe means for us today after the end of the Cold War is far vaguer—is it part of the 'West' (itself a notion with an outdated edge), a western part of 'Eurasia', both, or neither? The 'Europe' of the European Union may be a promise or a delusion, but it is not a reality. Taking the divisions and uncertainties of this continent seriously—as I have tried to do here—implies abandoning metaphysics, rejecting the search for some mysterious and essential 'Europe', and exploring instead the constant contest to define what it should mean.

Ultimately it is the question of values which lies at the heart of this history—the values which drove people to act, which shaped and transformed institutions, guided state policy and underpinned communities, families and individuals. 'Every social order is one of the possible solutions to a problem

that is not scientific but human, the problem of community life,' wrote the French scholar Raymond Aron in 1954. 'Are Europeans still capable of practising the subtle art required by liberal communities? Have they retained their own system of values?' The 'problem of community life' which Aron raises is perhaps the central theme of this essay. Against Aron, however, one must ask: what was Europe's 'own system of values'? Liberalism was but one of them, and there were others. Europe's twentieth century is the story of their conflict.

(Adapted from: Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century by Mark Mazower. Penguin, 1999.)

QUESTIONS

Underlined 1: Explain this part in Japanese specifically by clarifying what 'the way it did' means.

Underlined 2: Explain the details of the meaning of the sentence in Japanese.

Underlined 3: Who does the author refer to? Find ONE specific person from the passage and name him/her in English.

Underlined 4: Why can the author say that? Explain the reason(s) from the passage in Japanese.

Underlined 5: Explain the details of the meaning of this part in Japanese.

Underlined 6: What are they? Find each of them and list them in English.

- Underlined 7: Why can the author say that? Explain the reason(s) from the passage in Japanese.
- Underlined 8: Why can the author say that? Explain the reason(s) from the passage in Japanese.

П

"Of all the earth, as far as I know it, Cuenca has the most perfect climate," wrote Harry A. Franck, whose journeys through South America in the early twentieth century led to the book *Vagabonding Down the Andes*. "Always cool enough to be mildly stimulating to mind and body, yet never cold, it is excellent as a place for dreamy relaxing."

These last five words heightened my anticipation months before I first arrived. Franck stayed in the Ecuadorian city of Cuenca long enough to learn its charms and frustrations, both extremes still in abundance. I took his advice to get some business cards made up before leaving for South America. "The man who has his name printed on bits of cardboard, to exchange with great courtesy and profound bows with every upper-class acquaintance, is instantly accepted," he wrote. "Indeed, visiting cards should be as fixed a part of every Andean traveler's equipment as heavy boots." One cannot even accidentally bump into a stranger on a bus without the ritual exchange of cards, I quickly found. Mine included my name, home address, and the word "writer." Although it showed no business or institutional relationship, it gave me immediate status with all classes, for in a land where literacy is still a distant goal, foreign writers are welcomed as highly respected oddities.

This fame got me an invitation to give a talk before a class at the University of Cuenca on my second day in town. The course, an advanced-level seminar, was called Culture and Civilization of the English-Speaking Countries and met in the late afternoon. It was taught by a fellow American who had been in the country for more than a decade. He was one of twenty-five United States citizens living in Cuenca, a city of 130,000. "This semester they've been studying Jefferson and Hamilton. They know they are at the start of their own democracy, and they study U.S. history intently. Although their country goes back centuries, they sense they are at a new beginning."

About ten students sat at small desks in a small classroom. While I was being introduced, dozens of students, then hundreds, hurried by the room. The teacher stuck his head outside. "Well, class is over for the day," he announced. "They got a permit." Everyone stood up and left the room.

"What happened? I don't understand."

"Sometimes I don't either, but I just accept it. What happened is that a student group got a permit from the administration to call off classes and hold a rally in the main auditorium. They can do it practically anytime they want. It makes my lesson plans irrelevant. These things take place almost every week."

I went outside and joined the passing crowd. As I walked into the auditorium a student leader was speaking against the government for a recent rise in the cost of living while poor people starved. "Everything costs more now—bread, sugar, gasoline. The government wants it this way. So do imperialists and the rich. It's in their interest!" His speech was punctuated by shouts of approval, applause, and whistles at the women on the platform. "Considering the misery and exploitation that the Ecuadorian working class lives in, devaluation has raised the cost of living too high. The government has brought the country to virtual bankruptcy and total indebtedness." The national currency was in the middle of an alarming slide, losing two thirds of its value within about a year. "And the Malvinas Islands belong to Argentina," he put in as an afterthought, integrating South America's burning issue of the day into his speech. "The United States is to blame!"

Evidently I was the enemy in their midst, and I glanced around nervously. (7)
Friendly faces from the Culture and Civilization class grinned back. "Students have demonstrated in the capital," the speaker went on. "Students in Guayaquil have also marched through the streets." "We should do the same!" Thunderous applause greeted his suggestion, followed by rounds of chanting.

The group left the auditorium and slowly marched through the streets,

yelling slogans in rhythmic beat and blocking traffic. I moved along its outer edge. We were for the poor, against the rich; for "the people," against imperialism; for justice, against the United States. We wanted lower prices on basic necessities, and accused the government of promoting starvation. A part of the group broke away as we crossed over a bridge spanning the Tomebamba River. They burned tires in the middle of the street; then they burned a U.S. flag and ran it over with a four-wheel-drive American car. Dusk approached as the main body, thinning but still vocal, joined up with a group of workers and farmers just finishing up its own protest rally at a park in the heart of town. "Considering the miserable exploitation that exists in the Ecuadorian working class," the workers' leader shouted, "the cost of living has reached its limit!"

Cheers for his speech were suddenly silenced by the twenty-member municipal marching band, consisting of clarinet, trumpets, cymbals, saxophone, and tuba — playing, what? — the music was impossible to name, but the spirit and volume were high. The grand festival honoring Saint Peter and Saint Paul was underway, a week-long celebration centering in the park. Fifty little girls in tiny wedding gowns emerged from the cathedral, having taken part in a religious ceremony. Evening came to the plaza as the little girls, nuns, and demonstrators mingled with townspeople who slowly moved family by family to the square. The last of the demonstrators ran quickly from the crowd to set several automobile tires afire, but, except for the odor, their activities blended in with the festivities.

Cuenca is among the most Roman Catholic cities in Latin America—conservative, religious, and correct. Two cathedrals stare into the plaza. To the west is the New Cathedral, built in 1880. Across the plaza the Metropolitan Cathedral, built three centuries earlier, faces it. For the festival honoring Saint Peter and Saint Paul, a thousand people crowded in between the two cathedrals, drinking and shooting off fireworks, drinking and eating, drinking and singing.

Small card tables with camping stoves on top were set up throughout the plaza. A pot filled with water and cinnamon rested on each stove. Many bottles of clear sugarcane liquor were lined up next to the stoves. For ten cents the middle-aged Indian seller would pour a little liquor into a shot glass and fill the rest with a cupful from her bubbling pot. The glass had just come back from the dishwasher—her six-year-old barefoot son, beneath the table, who dipped each glass into a bucket of lukewarm water and wiped it with an old, dirty cloth.

Tooth-rotting confections sent a thick aroma through the carnival air. Potatoes and freshly popped corn added to the smell, mixed with meat, candy apples, rice, sugarcane, and what still hung in the air from the burning tires. Upper-class kids played about on park benches, posing for photographers whose aging cameras balanced on wooden tripods. Trucks slowly circled the plaza, with children in the back kissing, laughing, yelling, and waving to everyone.

(Adapted from: *The Panama Hat Trail* by Tom Miller. The University of Arizona Press, 1986.)

QUESTIONS

Underlined 1: What words is the author referring to here? Write the answer in English.

Underlined 2: Using words from the essay, write in English what the phrase "bits of cardboard" means.

Underlined 3: Explain in English the reason(s) why the person is famous.

- Underlined 4: Even though the author was invited to talk to a class, he was unable to do so. Explain the reason(s) in English.
- Underlined 5: What was "new" at that time for the people in Ecuador? Explain in English.
- Underlined 6: According to the passages, what did the protestors say, "the government wants"? Write the answer in English.
- Underlined 7: Explain in English why the author referred to himself as the enemy.
- Underlined 8: What does "its" refer to here? Explain in English.
- Underlined 9: Except for the students, the narrator, girls, nuns, townspeople and families, what other two groups took part in the demonstrations? Write the answer in English.
- Underlined 10: Do you think the shot glass was clean? Answer yes or no first and then write the reason(s) in English.
- Underlined 11: Based on the passage, which of the following statement(s) is/are NOT true?
 - (a) During the festival there is an abundance of public drinking.
 - (b) Cuenca has a nice climate.
 - (C) Literacy is not universal in Ecuador.
 - (d) The students were concerned about inflation.
 - (e) The students were upset about their classes.

Read the following passage and answer the questions which follow.

Ш

Last month, Britain appointed its first "minister for loneliness," who is charged with tackling what Prime Minister Theresa May called the "sad reality of modern life."

Public-health leaders immediately praised the idea — and for good reason. In recent decades, researchers have discovered that loneliness left untreated is not just mentally/psychologically painful; it also can have serious medical consequences. Thorough studies of widely spread diseases have linked loneliness and social isolation to heart disease, cancer, depression and suicide. Vivek Murthy, the former United States surgeon general, has written that loneliness and social isolation are "associated with a reduction in life span similar to that caused by smoking fifteen cigarettes a day and even greater than that associated with obesity."

But is loneliness, as many political officials and commentators are warning, a growing "health epidemic"? I do not believe so, nor do I believe it helps anyone to describe it that way. Social disconnection is a serious matter, yet if we generate a panic over its prevalence and impact, we are less likely to deal with it properly.

Anxiety about loneliness is a common feature of modern societies. Today, two major causes of loneliness seem possible. One is that societies throughout the world have embraced a culture of individualism. More people are living alone, and aging alone, than ever was true in the past. Neoliberal social policies have turned workers into individualistic and insecure free agents, and when jobs disappear, things fall apart fast. Labor unions, civic organizations, neighborhood organizations, religious groups and other traditional sources of social solidarity are in steady decline. Increasingly, we all feel that we are on our own.

The other possible cause is the rise of communications technology,

including smartphones, social media and the Internet. A decade ago, companies like Facebook or Google promised that their products would help create meaningful relationships and communities. Instead, we have used the media system to deepen existing divisions, at both the individual and group levels. We may have thousands of "friends" and "followers" on Facebook, but when it comes to human relationships, it turns out there is no substitute for building them the old-fashioned way, in person.

In light of these two trends, it is easy to believe we are experiencing an "epidemic" of loneliness and isolation. Surprisingly, though, the best data do not actually show drastic increases in either loneliness or social isolation.

The main evidence for rising isolation comes from a widely reported sociology journal article claiming that in 2004, one in four Americans had no one in their life they felt they could confide in, compared with one in ten in the 1980s. But that study turned out to be based on faulty data, and other research shows that the portion of Americans without a confidant is about the same as it has long been. Although one of the authors has distanced himself from the paper (saying, "I no longer think that it is reliable"), scholars, journalists and policymakers continue to cite it.

The other data on loneliness are potentially complicated and often contradictory, in part because there are so many different ways of measuring the phenomenon. But it is clear that the statistics indicating there is a loneliness epidemic are exceptions. For example, one set of statistics comes from a study that counted people as lonely if they felt "left out" or "isolated," or "lacked companionship"—even just "some of the time." That is an exceedingly low standard, and surely not one we would want doctors or policymakers to use in their work.

One reason we need to be careful about how we measure and respond to loneliness is that, as the University of Chicago psychologist John Cacioppo argues, an occasional and transitory feeling of loneliness can be healthy and productive. It is a biological signal to ourselves that we need to build stronger social bonds.

Professor Cacioppo has spent much of his career documenting the dangers of loneliness. But it is notable that he relies on more measured statistics in his own scientific papers than the statistics described above. One of his articles, from last year, reports that around nineteen percent of older Americans said they had felt lonely for much of the week before they were surveyed, and that in Britain about six percent of adults said they felt lonely all or most of the time. Those are worrisome numbers, but they are quite similar to the numbers reported in Britain in 1948, when about eight percent of older adults said they often or always felt lonely, and to those in previous American studies as well.

In particular, overstating the problem can make it harder to make sure we are focusing on the people who need help the most. When Britain announced its new minister, officials insisted that everyone, young or old, was at risk of loneliness. Yet the research tells us something more specific. In places like the United States and Britain, it is the poor, unemployed, displaced, and migrant populations that stand to suffer most from loneliness and isolation. When they get lonely, they are the least able to get adequate social or medical support.

I do not believe we have a loneliness epidemic. But millions of people are suffering from social disconnection. Whether or not they have a minister for loneliness, they deserve more attention and help than we are offering today.

(Adapted from: "Is loneliness really a health epidemic?" In *The New York Times* International Edition. Wednesday, February 14th, 2018.

Opinion.)

QUESTIONS

According to the content of the passage, write T for True, F for False or N for Not mentioned in the text for each statement. Answer a question with "N" only if the statement is either not present in the text or cannot be inferred from the information in the text.

- 1. Research has suggested a link between loneliness and a variety of illnesses, and this relationship is one of cause and effect like that associated with cigarette smoking and cancer.
- 2. Although the number of people living alone and aging alone is about the same now as it has always been, the author thinks that there still remains a loneliness epidemic.
- 3. A culture of individualism including social policies that stress the freedom of the individual to choose his/her own path in life is a likely cause of the perceived increase in loneliness.
- 4. By enlarging our range of associations, social media have allowed us to "build" more face-to-face friendships than previous civic associations such as neighborhood organizations, religious groups, and other sources of social solidarity which are now in decline.
- 5. Journalists and policymakers in the United States who cite an "epidemic" of loneliness are relying on the results of studies that may not have used reliable data.

- 6. The measurement of loneliness in all the different surveys only counted as "lonely" those who felt lonely "some of the time" without specifying the frequency of the loneliness.
- 7. As loneliness can be easily confused with other complaints (like boredom), some people "felt left out" and lonely even in face-to-face social occasions.
- 8. Because it is universal, people from all social classes in the U.S. and Britain are equally affected by loneliness.

Read the following and write an essay in English in about 200 words.

A recent study has suggested that Japanese people are less happy than the citizens of other developed countries. Write about (1) possible causes of unhappiness in Japan, <u>and</u> (2) two or three specific measures you would take to increase both your own happiness and the happiness of society in Japan.