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慶應義塾大学入学試験問題

総合政策学部

英語

注意事項

1. 試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開かないでください。
2. 受験番号と氏名は、解答用紙の所定の欄に必ず記入してください。
3. 解答用紙の「注意事項」を必ず読んでください。
4. この問題冊子は、表紙を含めて16ページあります（問題は2ページから14ページ）。  
試験開始の合図とともに、全てのページが揃っているか確認してください。ページの欠落・重複があった場合には、直ちに監督者に申し出てください。
5. 問題冊子は、試験終了後に必ず持ち帰ってください。

1. 次の文章に関して、空欄補充問題と読解問題の二つがあります。まず、[1]から[20]の空所を埋めるのに、文脈的に最も適切な語を1から3の中から選び、その番号を解答欄(1)から(20)にマークしなさい。次に、内容に関する[21]から[30]の設問には、1から4の選択肢が付されています。そのうち、文章の内容からみて最も適切なものを選び、その番号を解答欄(21)から(30)にマークしなさい。

1 Common sense is so ordinary that we tend to notice it only when it's missing, but it is absolutely essential to functioning in everyday life. Common sense is how we know what to wear when we go to work, how to behave on the street, and how to maintain harmonious relationships with our friends and coworkers.

2 For something we refer to so often, however, common sense is surprisingly hard to pin down. Roughly speaking, it is the loosely organized set of facts, observations, experiences, and pieces of wisdom that each of us accumulates over a lifetime in the course of dealing with everyday situations. Beyond that, it tends to [1](1. assist 2. resist 3. facilitate) easy classification.

3 However, there are two defining features of common sense that seem to differentiate it from other kinds of human knowledge like science or mathematics. The first of these features is that, unlike formal knowledge, common sense is overwhelmingly practical; it is more [2](1. indifferent to 2. concerned with 3. tolerant to) providing answers to questions than in worrying about how it came by the answers. In contrast to formal knowledge, common sense does not reflect on the world, but instead attempts to deal with it simply "as it is."

4 The second feature is that while the power of formal knowledge [3](1. does away with 2. presides over 3. resides in) its ability to organize specific findings into logical categories described by general principles, the power of common sense lies in its ability to deal with every concrete situation on its own terms. For example, it is a matter of common sense that what we wear or do or say in front of our boss will be different from how we behave in front of our friends. Common sense just "knows" what the appropriate thing to do is in any particular situation, [4](1. without 2. upon 3. while) knowing how it knows it.

5           As remarkable as it is, common sense exhibits some mysterious traits, one of the most striking of which is how much it varies across cultures. Several years ago, a group of economists and anthropologists [5](1. set out 2. put out 3. came off) to test how different cultures play a particular kind of game, called an ultimatum game. The game goes something like this: First, pick two people and give one of them \$100. That person then has to propose a split of the money between himself and the other player, ranging from offering them the whole amount to nothing at all. The other player then gets to accept the deal or reject it. If the second player accepts the deal, they get what they were offered and both players go on their [6](1. contented 2. satisfied 3. merry) way. But if they reject the offer, neither player gets anything; hence the “ultimatum.”

6           In hundreds of these experiments conducted in industrialized societies, researchers had already demonstrated that most players propose a fifty-fifty split, and offers of less than \$30 are typically rejected. Economists find this behavior surprising because it [7](1. agrees 2. conflicts 3. coincides) with their standard notion of economic rationality. Even a single dollar, the reasoning goes, is better than nothing at all, so from a strictly rational perspective, recipients ought to accept any offer above zero. And knowing this, rational “proposers” ought to offer the [8](1. least 2. most 3. less) they can get away with—namely, one dollar. Of course, a moment’s thought suggests why people play the way they do—namely that it doesn’t seem fair to [9](1. damage 2. jeopardize 3. exploit) a situation just because you can. Recipients being offered less than a third, therefore, feel taken advantage of and so opt to walk away from even a substantial sum of money in order to teach miserly proposers a [10](1. reason 2. lesson 3. fact). And anticipating this response, proposers tend to offer what they assume the recipient will consider a fair split.

7           If your reaction to this insight is that economists need to get out a little more, then you’re not alone. If anything seems like common sense, it’s that people care about fairness as well as money. But when the experimenters replicated the game in fifteen preindustrial societies across five continents, they found that people in different societies have very different ideas about what [11](1. reveals 2. counts 3. exhibits) as fair. At one extreme, the Machiguenga tribe of Peru tended to offer only about a quarter of the total amount, and virtually no offers were refused. At the other extreme, the Gnau tribe

of Papua New Guinea tended to make offers that were even better than fifty-fifty, but [12](1. logically 2. obviously 3. surprisingly) these “hyperfair” offers tended to get rejected just as frequently as unfair offers.

8        What explains these differences? As it turns out, the Gnau tribe had customs of gift exchange, according to which receiving a gift [13](1. obligates 2. expects 3. persuades) the receiver to reciprocate at some point in the future. Because there was no equivalent of the ultimatum game in the Gnau society, they simply “mapped” the unfamiliar interaction onto the most similar social exchange they could think of—which happened to be gift exchange—and responded [14](1. casually 2. belatedly 3. accordingly). Thus what might have seemed like free money to a Western participant looked to a Gnau participant very much like an [15](1. unearned 2. unwanted 3. unpredicted) obligation. The Machiguenga, by contrast, live in a society in which the only relationship bonds that carry any expectation of loyalty are with immediate family members. When playing the ultimatum game with a stranger, therefore, Machiguenga participants—again mapping the unfamiliar onto the familiar—saw little obligation to make fair offers, and experienced very little of the [16](1. resentment 2. contentment 3. euphemism) that would well up in a Western player upon being presented with a split that was patently unequal. To them, even low offers were seen as a good deal.

9        Once you understand these features of Gnau and Machiguenga cultures, their puzzling behavior starts to seem entirely reasonable—commonsense, even. And that’s exactly what it was. Just as we regard fairness and reciprocity as commonsense principles in our world that should be respected in general, so the people of the preindustrial societies have their own [17](1. immature 2. explicit 3. implicit) set of understandings about how the world is supposed to work. Those understandings might be different from ours. But once they have been accepted, their commonsense logic works in exactly the same way as ours does.

10       What these results reveal is that common sense is “common” only to the [18](1. extent 2. end 3. level) that two people share sufficiently similar social and cultural experiences. Common sense, in other words, depends on what the sociologist Harry Collins calls “collective tacit knowledge,” meaning that it is encoded in the social norms,

customs, and practices of the world. According to Collins, this type of knowledge can be learned only by participating in society itself.

11. One of the most important consequences of the socially [19](1. demanded 2. employed 3. embedded) nature of common sense is that disagreements over matters of common sense can be extremely difficult to resolve. The American anthropologist Clifford Geertz noted in his study of witchcraft in Java that “when the whole family of a Javanese boy tells me that the reason he has fallen out of a tree and broken his leg is that the spirit of his deceased grandfather pushed him out because some ritual duty has been inadvertently overlooked, it is precisely what they think has occurred, it is all they think has occurred, and they are puzzled only at my puzzlement at their lack of puzzlement.” Disagreements over matters of common sense, [20](1. however 2. in other words 3. by the way), are hard to resolve because it’s unclear to either side on what grounds one can even conduct a reasonable argument.

12. Whatever it is that people believe to be a matter of common sense, they believe it with absolute certainty. They are puzzled only at the fact that others disagree.

—Based on Duncan J. Watts (2011). *Everything Is Obvious: How Common Sense Fails*. London: Atlantic Books.

[21] According to the article, which of the following is **NOT** in accord with the characteristics of common sense?

1. It mainly serves to offer solutions to our daily problems.
2. It tries to account for various facts by underlying general principles.
3. It is very difficult to define exactly what common sense is.
4. It is so common that we hardly recognize its existence in everyday life.

[22] Which of the following best paraphrases the statement “common sense does not reflect on the world” in the 3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph?

1. Common sense does not “think” deeply about why the world is the way it is.
2. Common sense has nothing to do with the way we interact with the world.
3. Common sense is not good at representing the real world.
4. Common sense often contradicts the way in which the world really operates.

[23] Which of the following is **NOT** a characteristic of the game “ultimatum”?

1. The first player has the right to split the money in any way he or she likes.
2. If the second player does not accept the deal, neither player receives any money.
3. The second player can negotiate with the first player if the deal is unfair.
4. The first player can keep all the money if the second player agrees.

[24] Which of the following best characterizes the behavior of the people in industrialized societies when playing the ultimatum game?

1. Their behavior is based on the standard notion of economic rationality.
2. They are most likely to reject even a fifty-fifty split just to be mean to the proposer.
3. Proposers take into account what the recipient will regard as a fair deal.
4. Recipients are usually satisfied with whatever amount of money they might receive.

[25] In the 7<sup>th</sup> paragraph, the author discusses the way the Machiguenga tribe and the Gnau tribe play the ultimatum game in order to show that

1. the concept of fairness is different in different cultures.
2. people in preindustrial societies tend to be more generous than those in industrial societies.
3. it is impossible to make sense of the behavior of those in preindustrial societies.
4. people in preindustrial societies enjoy the ultimatum game just as much as those in industrial societies.

[26] In the 8<sup>th</sup> paragraph, it is mentioned that the Gnau people “mapped” the unfamiliar interaction onto their most similar social exchange. From this we can assume that the Gnau people

1. learned to win the ultimatum game by offering gifts to the proposer.
2. learned to play the ultimatum game by drawing charts.
3. drew a map of some of the important features of the ultimatum game.
4. drew an analogy between the ultimatum game and their customs of gift exchange.

[27] Which of the following would be the most likely behavior of the Machiguenga when they are playing the ultimatum game with a stranger?

1. They would be easily offended if they were offered an uneven split.
2. They would accept whatever small amount they might be offered.
3. They would do the best they could in order to be loyal to the stranger.
4. They would feel obliged to offer a fifty-fifty split.

[28] According to the article, which of the following is true about commonsense principles?

1. Commonsense principles such as fairness and reciprocity are universally accepted not only in industrial societies but also in preindustrial societies.
2. Commonsense principles of preindustrial societies will eventually be replaced by those of industrial societies.
3. Commonsense principles of preindustrial societies and those of industrial societies are both equally functional in their own societies.
4. Commonsense principles are deeply rooted in all kinds of human knowledge, including formal knowledge like science and mathematics.

[29] In the 11<sup>th</sup> paragraph, the author quotes Geertz's words about a Javanese boy in order to show

1. how difficult it is to resolve disagreements over matters of common sense.
2. that people in preindustrial societies are well aware of the kind of "collective tacit knowledge" they have accumulated over a lifetime.
3. that "collective tacit knowledge" often enhances understanding of a different culture.
4. how incompetent Geertz was in understanding Javanese culture.

[30] Given the nature of common sense as discussed in the article, we can safely infer that

1. our assumptions about the world are generally shared by different cultures.
2. commonsense knowledge can easily be turned into formal knowledge.
3. our shared common sense should be the foundation of international policy.
4. it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to replicate commonsense knowledge in computers.



11. 次の文章に関して、空所補充問題と読解問題の二つがあります。まず、[31]から[50]の空欄を埋めるのに、文脈的に最も適切な語を1から3の中から選び、その番号を解答欄(31)から(50)にマークしなさい。次に、内容に関する[51]から[60]の設問には、1から4の選択肢が付されています。そのうち、文章の内容からみて最も適切なものを選び、その番号を解答欄(51)から(60)にマークしなさい。

- 1        If human rights were a currency, its value would be in free fall, thanks to a gross inflation in the number of human rights treaties and nonbinding international instruments adopted by international organizations over the last several decades. These days, this currency is sometimes more likely to buy [31](1. cover 2. front 3. back) for dictatorships than protection for citizens. Human rights once enshrined the most basic principles of human freedom and dignity; today, they can include anything from the right to international solidarity to the right to peace.
- 2        Consider just how enormous the body of binding human rights law has become. The Freedom Rights Project, a research group that we co-founded, counts a full 64 human-rights-related agreements [32](1. by 2. under 3. with) the auspices of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. A member state of both of these organizations that has ratified all these agreements would have to comply with 1,377 human rights provisions (although some of these may be technical rather than substantive). Add to this the hundreds of non-treaty instruments, such as the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council (HRC). The aggregate body of human rights law now has all the [33](1. feasibility 2. accessibility 3. durability) of a tax code.
- 3        Supporters of human rights should worry about this explosion of regulation. If people are to demand human rights, then they must first be able to understand them—[34](1. a big shot 2. a tall order 3. a magic number) given the current bureaucratic tangle of administrative regulation. [35](1. Adopting 2. Solving 3. Compounding) this problem is the adoption of conflicting norms on particular human rights. For example, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, without qualification, that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.” Yet during the Cold War, at the instigation of communist states, conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is still [36](1. on 2.



at 3. by) the heart of the international human rights system, prohibited certain forms of "hate speech," with no clear guidelines on how to resolve the inherent conflict with freedom of expression. The consequence of this legal and moral confusion is that human rights are now sometimes [37](1. invoked 2. provoked 3. revoked) to restrict rather than protect free speech. Several UN member states, including Egypt and Pakistan, insist that derogatory statements about religion [38](1. contradict 2. rationalize 3. constitute) advocacy of religious hatred, which is prohibited under the ICCPR.

4       What explains the proliferation of human rights? The process has been driven partly by well-meaning lobbies for special interest groups that are looking for the trump card of having their cause recognized as a human rights issue. International human rights advocates, some national governments, and technocrats in international organizations seeking larger bureaucratic domains have also played a role.

5       But there is also a darker agenda behind the expansion of human rights law. Put simply, illiberal states have sought to stretch human rights law to give themselves room to hide behind it. They have even used it to [39](1. mitigate 2. mount 3. avoid) political attacks against liberal states. A critical look at the UN's often dysfunctional HRC is illustrative. Although it cannot adopt treaties or pass binding resolutions, the HRC is an important forum for developing new human rights standards and shaping the international human rights discourse. Judged by respect [40](1. to 2. on 3. for) human rights, its membership covers a wide spectrum, from democracies to tyrannies.

6       States ranked "free" in Freedom House's index tend to take a robust approach to human rights centered on what are called first-generation rights, such as free speech and freedom from torture. Although these countries are not necessarily opposed to what are called second-generation rights, which include quality of life issues such as housing and health, they are frequently skeptical about what are referred to as third-generation rights. This latter category encompasses ill-defined rights that protect collective rather than individual interests and includes the right to development, the right to international solidarity, and the right to peace.

7 In contrast, “partly free” and “not free” states have become the main proponents of third generation rights. For most of them, of course, these commitments in practice mean very little, since countries that do not adhere to the rule of law at home [41](1. freely 2. strictly 3. rarely) take international legal obligations seriously. But by presenting themselves as the champions of these new human rights, they seek to knock liberal states off the moral high ground and shore up their own political legitimacy.

8 Consider what happened at the most recent session of the HRC, when Cuba successfully sponsored resolutions on third-generation rights in the form of two resolutions: (1) Human Rights and International Solidarity and (2) Promotion of the Right to Peace. The former resolution, in part [42](1. shot 2. fired 3. aimed) at making development aid a “human right” for states, passed with 32 votes in favor and 15 against. Of the 32 states in favor, only ten were “free” (none of them Western), 15 were “partly free,” and seven, including Ethiopia and Mauritania, were “not free.” With the exception of “partly free” Moldova, the 15 countries that voted against were all “free” (European states joined by the United States, Japan, and South Korea).

9 A similar process [43](1. plays 2. breaks 3. comes) out at the Universal Periodic Review, a human rights exam that all member states at the UN have to undergo every four and a half years. In 2009, no less a human rights abuser than North Korea received praise from Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Syria for working “to consolidate a socialist and just society, which guarantees equality and social justice.” In May 2013, North Korea and Sudan [44](1. by turns 2. in turn 3. out of turn) encouraged Cuba to “work through the UN mechanism in progressive development of the third generation of human rights, particularly the value of international solidarity.”

10 The expanded and diluted notion of human rights allows illiberal states to change the focus from core freedoms to vague and conceptually unclear rights that place no concrete obligations on states. Enabled by such rhetoric, no human rights violation can stand scrutiny on its own merits. Instead, human rights violations are [45](1. relativized 2. cited 3. observed)—intellectually dismembered and discarded when it is politically expedient. In this world, cuts in development aid can be labeled human rights violations just like torture in North Korea. Crucially, this unprincipled politics of human

rights helps authoritarian states deflect criticism. In 2007, Cuba, which has one of the worst human rights records in the Western Hemisphere, succeeded in persuading a majority of HRC members to axe the specific mandate for monitoring its own human rights record. The praise authoritarian states shower on one another for [46](1. negatively 2. conversely 3. supposedly) upholding new, vague and abstract rights are therefore not just empty rhetoric but can produce real political gains.

- 11 Unfortunately, much of the human rights community has not only shied away from expressing qualms about rights proliferation, it has often led the process. But this approach has not helped advance the core freedoms that make the difference between liberal and non-liberal states. According to Freedom House, global respect for basic civil and political rights is in decline for the seventh consecutive year. Of course, it is exactly those basic rights that non-free states want to neuter. [47](1. Unless 2. When 3. Though) everything can be defined as a human right, the premium on violating such rights is cheap. To raise the stock and ensure the effectiveness of human rights, their defenders need to acknowledge that less is often more.

- 12 Respect for human rights around the world would likely be stronger if human rights law had stuck to a narrower and more clearly defined group of rights. The efforts and resources of human rights advocates and international institutions [48](1. must 2. would 3. shouldn't) have been much more targeted. Greater focus might have also resulted in better monitoring and more robust enforcement. Illiberal states would not have been able to lay any claim to human rights—let alone invoke them to delegitimize liberal states. Liberal states might have also concentrated their efforts on human rights institutions that, unlike the HRC, actually offer prospects of improvement through reform. The Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights, for example, partly through its own interpretive overreach, which has seen it [49](1. legalize 2. expand 3. denounce) existing rights and invent new ones, is losing credibility in some important member states such as the United Kingdom. European states have not done enough to address the crisis of Europe's oldest human rights institution.

- 13 Instead of rushing to respond to the human rights flavor of the month— [50](1. have 2. get 3. be) it protecting the elderly or defending the peasants—liberal

democracies should support institutions and treaties that embody the ideals that inspired the human rights movement in the first place.

—Based on Jacob Mchangama & Guglielmo Verdirame (2013). “The Danger of Human Rights Proliferation,” *Foreign Affairs*.

[51] The “right to international solidarity” and the “right to peace” are used as examples to illustrate that

1. some human rights are ill-defined and permit interpretive overreach.
2. the number of human rights has been decreasing substantially.
3. some human rights are opposed by illiberal states.
4. important rights have recently been added to the basic human rights.

[52] What is the point of mentioning “hate speech” in the 3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph?

1. Human rights function to protect freedom of speech.
2. Hate speech may be morally wrong, but legally prohibiting it restricts freedom of expression.
3. Human rights should be interpreted differently according to different norms.
4. Hate speech belongs to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a symbolic right.

[53] According to the article, which of the following is a factor that triggered the proliferation of human rights?

1. Special interest groups wanted their causes recognized as human rights issues.
2. Some states made derogatory statements about religion, leading to religious hatred.
3. International human rights advocates stopped seeking to expand human rights law.
4. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibited hate speech.

[54] Which of the following best characterizes third-generation rights?

1. They include most of the second-generation rights such as housing and health.
2. They encompass all types of human rights including those for both groups and individuals.
3. They include rather vague rights such as the rights to development and peace.
4. They are the most advanced human rights, embracing both first-generation and second-generation rights.

[55] As stated in the 7<sup>th</sup> paragraph, non-free states support third-generation rights

1. not because the rights are important to abide by, but because they want to use them to secure stronger political positions.
2. not because the rights are based on the international consensus, but because international obligations override the rule of law at home.
3. not because the rights are what non-free states seek, but because free states hold higher moral standards.
4. not because non-free states can be the champions of new human rights, but because they want to increase their popularity at home.

[56] The main point of the 8<sup>th</sup> paragraph can be summarized as:

1. Free states employ third-generation human rights in their favor and make the basic human rights less solid.
2. Free states and non-free states have their own interests but use universal norms to decide on what rights to support.
3. A non-free state like Cuba is capable of passing resolutions on third-generation human rights.
4. An increasing number of third-generation human rights have upgraded the universal basic human rights such as civil and political rights.

[57] In what sense do the authors use the term "rhetoric" as used in the 10<sup>th</sup> paragraph?

1. Rhetoric is nothing but rhetoric and does not have political power.
2. Rhetoric is a means of rationalization which can produce political advantage.
3. Rhetoric is a powerful tool, but does not change the essence of things.
4. Rhetoric is a figure of speech, but can curb the proliferation of human rights.

[58] Which of the following is **NOT** appropriate as an implication of "less is often more" in the 11<sup>th</sup> paragraph? Putting human rights in a narrower range would make

1. people respect human rights more.
2. the enforcement of human rights law more feasible.
3. it difficult for non-free states to use human rights to rationalize their claims.
4. free states support the activities of the Human Rights Council.

[59] Which of the following is suggested in the 11<sup>th</sup> paragraph?

1. Free states have not accelerated the process of human rights proliferation.
2. The line of demarcation between free states and non-free states has become clearer.
3. The international community respects basic human rights more than in the past.
4. It is getting easier to violate human rights without incurring severe penalty.

[60] Which of the following best describes the authors' position about human rights?

1. We should understand human rights in changing contexts.
2. We should limit the range of human rights in order to protect them.
3. We should differentiate human rights for free states from the ones for non-free states.
4. We should create human rights enforcing institutions.



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